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SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW FOR THE YEAR
1943-1944*
VIII. PUBLIC LAW

T HE COURTS of

Illinois have had little to say during
the past year on matters affecting the law as it relates
either to administrative tribunals or to public utilities while
those decisions which involve principles of conflict of laws
have already been noted elsewhere.'
Some other decisions
concerning aspects of public law are, however, worthy of comment and are presented in the following sections.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

The constitutionality of the federal Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942' was involved in the case of Regan v.
Kroger Grocery & Baking Company3 which was a proceeding
begun to collect damages for violations of Section 205(e) of
the Act.4 Plaintiff alleged that he had been charged more than
the ceiling prices establishel by the General Maximum Price
Regulation of May 18, 1942, on three different occasions and
asked judgment for $50.00 for each alleged violation. Among
other defenses, the defendant claimed that (1) the statute was
unconstitutional, and (2) that the provisions of Section 205 (e)
were penal in character hence could not be enforced in the
courts of Illinois. General attack on the statute was made on
the ground that it was beyond the power of Congress to regulate the prices at which personal property might be bought in
purely local or intrastate transactions. It was also argued
that Section 204(d) violated the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution by denying to
the state courts the power to pass upon the validity of the act
* The first seven section of this survey appeared in 23 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw 1 et seq.
' See comment on Atkins v. Atkins, 386 Ill. 345, 54 N. E. (2d) 488 (1944) ; Brown
v. Hall, 385 Ill. 260, 52 N. E. (2d) 781 (1944) ; and Fuhrhop v. Austin, 385 Ill.
149, 52 N. E. (2d) 267 (1944), which appeared in the section on Family Law, 23
CHICAGO-KENT LAw REVIE;W 47-51.
2 50 U. S. C. A. Appendix § 901 et seq.
S38'6 I1. 284, 54 N. E. (2d) 210 (1944). Thompson, J., wrote a dissenting opinion
based primarily on the ground that the judgment was against the weight of the
evidence.
450 U. S. C. A. § 925(e).
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The court,
or of any price regulation made pursuant to it.
nevertheless, interpreted the language of that section to mean
that the jurisdictional limitations applied only to suits in
equity brought to restrain the enforcement of the act and to
questions involving the validity of regulations promulgated
under the act as distinguished from questions involving the
validity of the act itself. Since the validity of the act could be
made an issue in actions to enforce its provisions, there was no
violation of due process. The court further upheld the constitutionality of the statute under the war powers of the Congress. By way of answer to the contention that the Illinois
courts should not enforce the provisions of Section 205(e)
because they were penal in character, the court held the rule
inapplicable to statutes of the United States. It was said to
be established law that Illinois courts will not enforce the
penal laws of a foreign jurisdiction. Acts of Congress, however, are laws of Illinois and together with the State laws form
one system of jurisprudence. The State courts are merely
given concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts to enforce the laws of a common country.
In Metropolitan Trust Company v. Jones,6 the Supreme
Court held unconstitutional the provision of the Small Loans

Act which prohibits a licensee thereunder from pledging any
note or security given by a borrower, except with a bank
authorized to transact business in Illinois under an agreement
permitting the Director of Insurance to examine the papers
so hypothecated.7 Plaintiff, a trust company, sought an injunction to restrain the enforcement of the provision and the
regulation thereunder on the ground that the due process and
equal protection clauses were violated. The court held that
5 50 U. S. C. A. § 924(d) declares that: "The Emergency Court of Appeals, and
the Supreme Court upon review of judgments and orders of the Emergency Court
of Appeals, shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of any regulation or order issued under section 2 . . . of any price schedule effective in
accordance with the provisions of section 206 . . . and of any provision of-any such
regulation, order, or price schedule. Except as provided in this section, no court,
Federal, State, or Territorial, shall have jurisdiction or power to consider the
validity of any such regulation, order, or price schedule, or to stay, restrain, enjoin,
or set aside, in whole or in part, any provision of this Act authorizing the issuance
of such regulations or orders, or making effective any such price schedule, or any
provision of any such regulation, order, or price schedule, or to restrain or enjoin
the enforcement of any such provision."
6384 Ill. 248, 51 N. E. (2d) 256 (1943).
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 74, § 30.
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the exemption of banks, which was refused to trust companies,
was unreasonable and arbitrary in view of the fact that trust
companies were under the same supervision as banks and no
reason appeared to exist why the purposes of the Small Loans
Act were better served by refusing the exemption to them.
Other provisions of the statute were not disturbed by the
ruling.
A third decision of interest was that in the case of People
ex rel. Baker v. Strautz.s In that case the statute authorizing
a judge or justice of the peace to order examination and treatment of any person charged with crime who may be suffering
from any communicable venereal disease9 was held not to violate the due process clause. The statutory language authorizes
the judicial officer to proceed "when it appears . . . from the
evidence or otherwise that any person coming before him on
any criminal charge may be suffering from any communicable
venereal disease. . . ." Such language was held not to confer
any power upon such officer outside of the evidence before him
but to limit his power to cases in which the evidence tends to
create a reasonable suspicion of the existence of communicable
disease. However, it was decided that a charge of soliciting
to prostitution in itself created such a reasonable inference.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

The validity of municipal ordinances vacating public streets
.was questioned in two cases during the past year in each of
which the municipality attempted to justify its action under
pertinent provisions of the statutes which purport to declare
that municipal action in such cases is conclusive. In the first of
them, that of People ex rel. Hill v. Eakin,l° a majority of the
court found that some public benefit was derived from the
vacation ordinance so decided to treat the action of the city
council thereon as final and conclusive." In the other, that of
8386

Ill. 360, 54 N. E. (2d) 441 (1944).
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 23, § 392.
10383 Ill. 383, 50 N. E. (2d) 474 (1943). Gunn and Thompson, JJ., dissented.
" The statute there involved, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 145, § 1, was subsequently
repealed but the substance of the language thereof was incorporated in Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1943, Ch. 24, § 69-11.
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People ex rel. Foote v. Kelly, 1 2 the court indicated that the
determination of the city council is not necessarily conclusive
on the courts despite statutory language purporting to achieve
that result 3 so that, if there is allegation that no public benefit
arises from the vacation ordinance, the court may conduct
inquiry to ascertain if there has been an abuse of discretion in
that regard.
More has been said on the subject of municipal liability
for salaries due firemen and policemen under "minimum
salary" statutes." The Appellate Court holding in George v.
City of Danville," which had held invalid an agreement by
firemen to accept a lesser salary in consideration that none
would be discharged and all would have less work to do, was
carried to the Illinois Supreme Court where such holding was
affirmed over a vigorous dissent that to permit recovery would
perpetrate a fraud on the municipality.16 In Patteson v. City
of Peoria7 it was held that a minimum salary statute, since
repealed, 8 applied to six female employees of a police department, two of whom were policewomen, two matrons, and two
clerks in the bureau of identification, as all were deemed to be
performing police duties in a regularly constituted police
department and the word "policeman," as used in such statute,
was not limited to male persons. Provisions of such statutes
were also held to apply to de facto officers in Kohler v. City of
8
Kewanee."
Liability on municipal contracts was considered in two
cases where, upon finding that the public corporation had no
right to make a valid binding contract, recovery in quasi-contract for benefits received through such transactions was like12

385 Ill. 543, 53 N. E.

(2d) 429 (1944-),

noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

296. Murphy, J., wTote a dissenting opinion in which he relied on People ex rel.
Hill v. Eakin, 383 Ill. 383, 50 N. E. (2d) 474 (1943).
13 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 24, § 69-11.

14 Ibid., Ch. 24, §§ 11-2 and 12-2.
15315 Ill. App. 17, 42 N. E.
REVIEW 63.

(2d)

300 (1942),

noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW

a 383 Ill. 45N, 50 N. E. (2d) 467 (1943), noted in 42 Mich. L. Rev. 720, affirming
315 Ill. App. 17, 42 N. E. (2d) 300 (1942). Smith, J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
17 386 Ill. 460, 54 N. E. (2d) 445 (1944), reversing 318 Ill. App. 245, 47 N. E. (2d)
867 (1943).

is II. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 24, §§ 860a-560b.
19321 Ill. App. 479, 53 N. E. (2d) 479 (1944)
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wise denied. In Ashton v. County of Cook 2' a contract by a
private attorney to collect forfeited taxes on a contingent
basis was rejected and recovery on quantum meruit was
denied because the function of collecting such defaulted taxes
belonged to the state's attorney, a constitutional officer. Failure by the municipal corporation to provide an appropriation
in advance was held reason to repudiate a contract to purchase
a road grader in Galion Iron Works & Manufacturing Co. v.
City of Georgetown1 and, as that transaction was invalid, it
necessarily followed that there could be no recovery for the
use made by the municipality of the equipment.
Questions concerning tort liability of municipal corporations have led to some hairline distinctions in the past between
governmental and proprietary functions. Three such cases
arose during the period of this survey. In McKeown v. City
of Chicago 2 the negligent act of city firemen in flooding a
vacant lot for ice-skating purposes was held sufficient to establish municipal liability since it did not constitute a governmental function. For that matter, carelessness in burning
brush which had been removed from city streets after a heavy
storm, so that private property was destroyed, was held
actionable in Peterson v. City of Gibson" against the claim
that the municipal employer was rendered immune because
acting in its governmental capacity. In Sykes v. City of
Berwyn, 24 however, the carelessness of a police officer while
cleaning out a squad car was deemed insufficient to establish
municipal liability as the act being done was held to be immediately related to a clearly governmental function.
A unique case involving municipal power to levy a special
assessment was presented in City of DesPlainesv. Boeckenhauer2 51 where a sewer assessment had been levied against
land outside of but adjoining the municipality. After confirmation of the assessment and payment of three of the in384 Ill. 287, 51 N. E. (2d) 161 (1943).
21322 Ill. App. 498, 54 N. E. (2d) 601 (1944).
22319 Il.
App. 563, 49 N. E. (2d) 729 (1943), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REvmv 96.
23322 Ill. App. 97, 54 N. E. (2d) 79 (1944). Leave to appeal has been denied.
24320 Il. App. 440, 51 N. E. (2d) 587 (1943). Leave to appeal has been denied.
25383 Ill. 4175, 50 N. E. (2d) 483 (1943).
20
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stallments, the land owner petition to have the same declared
null and void. The city contend that inasmuch as the property
in question had. been, subsequent to the special assessment
proceeding, annexed to the municipality the assessment should
stand particularly since the petition amounted to a collateral
attack on the judgment of confirmation. It was, nevertheless,
held that the original proceeding was wholly void and that no
estoppel had arisen from the fact that the landowner had
expressly requested that the land be assessed for the improvement made thereto. The action of the trial court in quashing
the assessment was, therefore, confirmed.
The final chapter in the litigation involving the power of a
municipality to prevent the use of paper milk containers appears
to have been written by the decision in Dean Milk Company
v. City of Chicago."6 Federal proceedings, which had been
instituted to test the validity of a city ordinance requiring that
milk be delivered in "standard milk bottles, ' '2

had been sus-

pended to await the outcome of state court proceedings on the
same point. It has now been decided, by a divided court, that
paper containers do not measure up to the standard fixed by.
the ordinance and that such ordinance does not conflict with
the provisions of the statute regulating the pasteurization of
milk.28 Municipal power to act on the subject was said to rest
on several sections of the Cities and Villages Act." The position of the city having been vindicated, the ordinance in question was subsequently amended to permit the use of paper
containers as well as glass milk bottles."0
Only one zoning case is worthy of mention, and that case
is City of Watseka v. Blatt3 wherein was involved the validity
of a zoning ordinance which forbade the use of land for a junk
yard unless the same was located in an industrial district and
20 385 I1. 565, 53 N. E. (2d) 612 (1944).
Stone, J., wrote a dissenting opinion
in which Wilson and Gunn, JJ., concurred.
27 Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 316 U. S. 168, 62 S. Ct. 986, 86 L.
Ed. 1355 (1942), noted in 21 CIICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw 75.
2s Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 56/2, § 115 et seq.
29 Ibid., Ch. 24, §§ 23-63, 23-64, 23-81 and 23-105.
30 Mun. Code, Chicago, § 154-14 as amended March 16, 1944. permits the use of
single service containers complying with United States Public Health Service
standards for the duration of the war and six months thereafter.
31320 Ill. App. 191, 50 N. E. (2d) 589 (1943).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

then permitted such use only if frontage consents were given
and specific approval was obtained from the board of zoning
appeals. It was held that the power of the city council to
adopt zoning ordinances3 2 was a delegated power which could
not be re-delegated by it to a zoning board, hence the restriction in question was invalid.
TAXATION

An old tax question, complicated by modern developments, came before the court in Sanitary District of Chicago
v. Rhodes33 in which case the district sued to enjoin the
county collector of Will County from collecting real estate
taxes levied against that portion of the district's main channel
located within such county. Exemption was claimed on the
theory that the channel constituted "public grounds owned by
a municipal corporation and used exclusively for public purposes." 4 Upon finding that the channel was not used exclusively for public purposes, a decree denying an injunction was
affirmed on the fundamental proposition that laws exempting
property from taxation will be subject to strict construction.
Attention was called last year to decisions concerning the
applicability of the Retailers' Occupation Tax Act- to the
solicitation of retail sales in this state by out-of-state vendors. 6 Subsequent to the outcome of such cases, the legislature amended Section lb of the statute 37 so as to make the
same apply to sales by foreign vendors operating through
soliciting agents in this state. Further litigation ensued over
the question of the validity of such amendment and it is understood that the Circuit Court of Sangamon County declared the
same to be unconstitutional.3 ' No review of such ruling has
been sought by the Department of Finance. In view of the
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 24, § 73-1 et seq.
269, 53 N. E. (2d) 869 (1944).
34 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 120, § 500(9), grants an exemption in such cases.
35 People ex rel. Thompson v. First Cong. Church, 232 Ill.
158, 83 N. E. 536 (1908).
36 See comment on Ex-Cell-O Corp. v. McKibbin, 383 Ill. 316, 50 N. E. (2d)
505
(1943), in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REvIEw 70.
37 Laws 1943, Vol. 1, p. 1121; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 120, § 440b.
38 See report of decision in Ex-Cell-O Corp. v. Collins, in Corp. Tax Service (Illinois) p. 6501.
32

3 386 Il1.
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little publicity given to such holding, it is deemed wise to
give emphasis thereto. 9
The holding of the earlier Appellate Court decision in
People's Drug Shop, Inc. v. Moysey,4 ° dealing with the right
of the retailer to pass the occupation tax on to the consumer,
was affirmed when that case reached the Illinois Supreme
Court. 4 As could be expected in view of the theory underlying such tax42 and the unambiguous language of the statute,4" the court held the levy was one imposed on the retailer
and one which he could not, unless as a hidden charge or by
express agreement, pass on to the consumer. Suits for refunds
based on Section 6 of the same statute were presented in

Svithiod Singing Club v. McKibbin" and People ex rel.
Sterling Lumber & Supply Company v. Workman45 in both
of which cases recovery was denied as neither plaintiff was
able to show that it had repaid the purchasers the amounts
collected from them, repayment of which was a condition to
recovery of a refund from the state.46
Injunction to restrain an alleged illegal levy of tax under
the same statute was sought in Owens-Illinois Glass Company v. McKibbin47 but was resisted on the ground that, inasmuch as the statute permits the payment of tax under protest
and provides for an orderly process to obtain a refund, resort
to equity was unnecessary and improper. Such injunction
was upheld on the theory that courts of equity have always
granted injunctions against the levy of an illegal tax as an

.

39 Other cases dealing with the application of the statute prior to its amendment
as aforesaid are Allis-Chalmers Co. v. Wright, 383 Ill. 363, 50 N. E. (2d) 508 (1943),
and Ayrshire Corp. v. Nudelman, 383 Ill. 345, 50 N. E. (2d) 509 (1943). In each
case sales were made by out-of-state vendors through soliciting agents in Illinois,
but the property sold was located outside of the state, title passed outside thereof,
and the orders were actually accepted in the foreign state. Such sales were held to
be non-taxable.
40 317 Ill. App. 370, 45 N. E. (2d) 978 (1943).
41 People's Drug Shop, Inc., v. Moysey, 384 11. 283, 51 N. E. (2d) 144 (1943).
42 Reif v. Barrett, 355 Ill. 104, 188 N. E. 889 (1933).
43 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 120, § 441.
44384 Ill. 493, 51 N. E. (2d) 550 (1943). A companion case, that of Svithiod
Singing Club v. McKibbin, 381 Ill. 194, 44 N. E. (2d) 904 (1942), noted in 22
CHiCAGO-KENT LAW RLvmw 69 and 38 Ill. L. Rev. 107, had decided that the club
in question was not a retailer within the meaning of the statute.
45385 Il1. 18, 52 N. E. (2d) 259 (1944).
46 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 120, § 445.
47385 I1. 245, 52 N. E. (2d) 177 (1944).
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exception to the general rule that equity will not take jurisdiction where there is an adequate remedy at law.
Application of the statute to particular occupations was
also considered in two cases. In Stolze Lumber Company v.
Stratton," a materials supply concern which furnished building materials to contractors and subcontractors successfully
contended that the 1941 amendment to the statute seeking to
impose tax liability on such concerns" . was unconstitutional
as not being within the scope of the title of the statute and,
absent such provision, they were not engaged in selling at
retail." In the other case, that of Huston Brothers Company
v. McKibbin,"1 a similar holding was reached with regard to a
drug concern furnishing medical and pharmaceutical supplies
to doctors and hospitals.
Legislative attempts to impose taxes on the production
of oil within the state 2 collapsed under the impact of the
decision in Ohio Oil Company v. Wright" which held the
statute unconstitutional as a direct violation of Section 1 of
Article IX of the state constitution. The court's reasoning
therein followed the pattern that, as applied to royalty owners,
the tax was not one on an occupation but rather constituted
a direct tax on income from property hence amounted to a
direct tax on the property itself. 4 As applied to actual producers of oil, the court indicated that the statute might form
an acceptable basis for regulating an occupation but because
it was lacking in uniformity the court felt obliged to declare
the statute void in toto.
Several cases have arisen in the general property tax field.
The rule of Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company v. State Tax
Commission" was productive of further litigation to deter396 Ill. 334, 54 N. E. (2d) 554 (1944).
Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 1079; II. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 120, § 440.
50 Material Service Corp. v. McKibbin, 380 Ill. 226, 43 N. E. (2d) 939 (1942),
noted in 22 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REvIEW 70.
51 386 Ill. 479, 54 N. E. (2d) 564 (1944).
52 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 1068; Il1.
Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 120, § 416.1 et seq.
53 386 Ill. 206, 53 N. E. (2d) 966 (1944).
54 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 15 S. Ct. 673, 39 L. Ed.
759 (1895).
55 374 Ill. 75, 28 N. E. (2d) 100 (1940).
48

49

SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW-193-191,

mine the function of the Department of Revenue which is
obliged to value railroad property and capital stock." It was
held, in People ex rel. Little v. Collins,7 that the work of the
Department combines two separate functions, namely assessment and equalization, and that the "original assessments"
referred to in the statutory requirement concerning publication thereof dealt with the established fair cash value of property and not the equalized tax which might be imposed
thereon. In People ex rel. Voorhees v. Chicago, Burlington
& Quincy Railroad Company 8 it was held that a town levy
for "home relief (including veterans)" was invalid as the burden of providing relief for destitute veterans was on the
county" whereas the township was limited to, the care of
paupers generally."
Efforts to collect a judgment against a
county, by compelling the county board to levy a tax for its
satisfaction, came to naught in Woodmen of the World Life
Insurance Society v. Cook County61 when the court found
that constitutional limits on taxation would be violated by an
additional levy while the maximum tax permitted was being
entirely devoted to current and necessary expenses and liabilities.
Enforcement of tax liens by foreclosure was given added
impetus by the decision in Village of Palatine v. Palanois
Estates, Inc.,6 2 where the court held that foreclosure for unpaid special assessments was permissible even though the
property was also encumbered by general property tax liens.
It was indicated that to deny the right of the local government
to sue except as a party to foreclosure proceedings brought to
enforce general taxes would amount to an impairment of the
authority to make local improvements.6 "
Still another, and apparently the final, chapter in the liti56 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 120.

§ 618.

- 386 Il1. 83, 53 N. E. (2d) 853 (1944).
58 386 I1. 200, 53 N. E. (2d) 963 (1944).
59 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 23, § 154a.
6 Ibid., Ch. 139, § 39 (31/).

61322 I1. App.'112, 53 N. E. (2d) 994 (1944), cause transferred 381 IMl. 558, 46
N. E. (2d) 35 (1943).
62 319 Ill. App. 474, 49 N. E.

(2d)

655 (1943).

63 1ll. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 24, § 84-1 et seq.
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gation to compel payment of the 1928-9 tax anticipation warrants issued by the Board of Education of the City of Chicago
was written in two decisions delivered last year. In the first,
64
that in Leviton v. Board of Education of City of Chicago,
the statute purporting to authorize school boards to issue
bonds to pay judgment indebtedness6 5 was held unconstitutional as applied to judgments on such tax warrants because
the effect thereof would be to make the same payable from
revenue other than that upon which such warrants were
drawn. In the other, that of People ex rel. Reconstruction
6 6 mandamus was
Finance Corporation v. City of Chicago,
held properly denied on the ground that such warrants do not
create a debt on the part of the issuing body. Judgments
based on such warrants were left undisturbed, but the effect
of the decision was to make the same unenforcible. The
holders of the warrants in question would now seem to be
without relief except so far as they might be able to get contribution through an accounting proceeding against former
holders who had been paid in full.
Questions arising under the Unemployment Compensation Act 6 7 do not, technically, belong in the classification of
taxation for the contribution collected thereunder is not a
form of taxation although often thought of in that light. That
statute was, however, held constitutional in Oak Woods
Cemetery Association v. Murphy" as a proper exercise of the
police power. At the same time, the court found therein that
the exemption granted thereunder to agricultural labor did
not extend to greenhouse workers employed by a cemetery.
Other constitutional issues were raised in Zehender & Factor,
Inc. v. Murphy6 9 where it was argued that property was being
taken without due process by reason of attempts to impose
assessments on distinct corporate entities merely because the
same happened to be owned or controlled by the same inter64 385
65 Ill.
66386
67 Il.

Ill. 599, 53 N. E. (2d) 596 (1944).
Rev., Stat. 1943, Ch. 122, § 327.62 et seq.
Ill. 522, 54 N. E. (2d) 508 (1944).
Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, § 217 et seq.
68383 Ill. 301, 50 N. E. (2d) 582 (1943).
69386 Il. 258, 53 N. E. (2d) 944 (1944).
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ests ° The court observed that the legislative purpose was to
prevent decentralization of business to avoid being obliged to
make contribution to the unemployment compensation fund
and regarded the statute as one which established a reasonable basis for classification.
Applicability of the statute to particular occupations and
to unusual features of employment would seem to be likely to
generate as much litigation as that which arose under the
Retailers' Occupation Tax Act. Such inference at least would
seem to follow from the decision in Ozark Minerals Company
v. Murphy"1 where certain silica workers were held not to be
employees but independent contractors because they were
paid on a per ton basis of accepted output and were free to
work when they pleased so long as they maintained a desired
quota. The point of separation between employee and inde2
pendent contractor may be hard to determine hereafter.1
Benefits under the statute, however, are to be paid only in case
of an involuntary unemployment, according to Walgreen
Company v. Murphy,73 which denied compensation to employees who had participated in a labor dispute and thereby
produced the stoppage of work out of which the claim of compensation arose.
7o Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, § 218(e) (5).
71384 Ill. 94, 51 N. E. (2d) 197 (1943). Murphy, J., wrote a concurring opinion.
Thompson, J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
72 In Zelny v. Murphy, 387 Ill. 492, 56 N. E. (2d) 754 (1944), not in the period of
this survey, the court was able to find some evidence of control by the employer so
As to support imposition of the burdens of the statute, although the contracts were
practically identical with those in the Ozark case.
73386 Ill. 32, 53 N. E. (2d) 390 (1944).

